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How do liquidation values affect financial contract renegotiation? While the 'incomplete contracting'
theory of financial contracting predicts that liquidation values determine the allocation of bargaining
power between creditors and debtors, there is little empirical evidence on financial contract renegotiations
and the role asset values play in such bargaining. This paper attempts to fill this gap. We develop an
incomplete-contracting model of financial contract renegotiation and estimate it using data on the airline
industry in the United States. We find that airlines successfully renegotiate their lease obligations downwards
when their financial position is sufficiently poor and when the liquidation value of their fleet is low.
Our results show that strategic renegotiation is common in the airline industry. Moreover, the results
















The control rights that ﬁnancial contracts provide over ﬁrms’ underlying assets play a fundamental
role in the incomplete contracting literature. In particular, debt contracts provide creditors the
right to possess assets when ﬁrms default on promised payments (see e.g. Aghion and Bolton
(1992), Bolton and Scharfstein (1996), Hart and Moore (1994), Hart and Moore (1998), and Shleifer
and Vishny (1992)). This threat of asset liquidation motivates debtors to avoid default. Thus,
in the incomplete contracting literature, asset liquidation values play a key role in the ex-post
determination of debt payments. When liquidation values are low, debtors bargaining position
improves vis-` a-vis creditors, and all else equal, debt payments should decrease.
But how do liquidation values aﬀect ﬁnancial contract renegotiation in practice? While previous
research has analyzed some of the implications of the incomplete contracts approach for ﬁnancial
contracting,1 there is little empirical evidence analyzing the ability of ﬁrms to renegotiate their
ﬁnancial liabilities and the role asset values play in such renegotiations. This paper attempts to
ﬁll this gap by documenting empirically the conditions under which airlines renegotiate aircraft
leases in the United States. Our goal is to understand the factors that enable airlines to extract
concessions in renegotiation, and to estimate the magnitude of the concessions that airlines obtain.
We ﬁnd that publicly traded airlines often renegotiate their lease contracts. Furthermore, we show
that aircraft lease renegotiations take place when liquidation values are low and airlines’ ﬁnancial
condition is poor.
Aircraft leases are a natural environment for testing renegotiation based models. While the
incomplete contracts literature focuses on debt contracts and assumes that creditors have the right
to seize an asset if the debtor defaults, the automatic stay provision of the U.S. bankruptcy code
protects debtors from foreclosures and repossessions. In contrast to creditors, in bankruptcy lessors
are not subject to the automatic stay provision. Thus, matching the stylized assumption in the
literature, lessors have the abilityto relativelyswiftly take possession of their assets if a ﬁrm defaults
on its lease payments.2
We begin our analysis by developing a simple theoretical model of contract renegotiation based
on Hart and Moore (1994). To determine the credibility of ﬁrms’ threat to renegotiate pre-existing
1See e.g. Benmelech (2006), Benmelech, Garmaise and Moskowitz (2005), Bergman and Nicolaievsky (2006),
Kaplan and Str¨ omberg (2003), and Str¨ omberg (2000).
2See for example Pulvino (1998), and Eisfeldt and Rampini (2006).
1ﬁnancial contracts, we model explicitly the renegotiation process between the ﬁrm and its liability
holders as in Bergman and Callen (1991). Our model has two testable implications. First, ﬁrms
will be able to credibly renegotiate their ﬁnancial commitments only when their ﬁnancial situation
is suﬃciently poor. Second, when a ﬁrm’s ﬁnancial position is suﬃciently poor, and hence its rene-
gotiation threat is credible, a reduction in the liquidation value of assets increases the concessions
that the ﬁrm obtains in renegotiation. Therefore, the positive relation between liquidation values
and post-renegotiation ﬁrm payments to creditors predicted in Hart and Moore (1994, 1998) should
be concentrated during times when ﬁrms are doing poorly.
As motivational evidence for our empirical analysis, we begin by providing a short case study
which describes American Airlines’s renegotiation of lease contracts subsequent to its acquisition
of TWA in January of 2001. We show that American substantially reduced lease payments on
aircraft previously owned by TWA, and estimate the present value of the cost reductions due to
lease renegotiation at 36 percent. Anecdotal evidence suggests that American could successfully
renegotiate the lease payments because of TWA’s dire ﬁnancial position and because of American’s
credible threat to reject TWA’s leases and return the aircraft to lessors.
Our empirical analysis examines renegotiation of leases amongst U.S. airlines. We collect data
on all publicly traded, passenger-carriers and construct a dataset which includes information about
contracted lease payments, actual lease payments, and ﬂeet composition by aircraft type. In addi-
tion, we construct four diﬀerent measures of the ease of overall redeployability of an airline’s leased
aircraft. Fleet redeployability serves as a proxy for the value of the outside option that lessors have
when a lessee fails to make a promised payment, and hence as a proxy for liquidation values.
We then examine how an airline’s ﬁnancial condition combined with the redeployability of its
ﬂeet aﬀect lease renegotiation. As the model predicts, lease payments are reduced during periods
of poor ﬁnancial performance. Our regression analysis suggest that during years in which cash ﬂow
from operations and cash balances fall short of interest expense, the average ratio of an airline’s
actual lease payment to its previous years contracted lease payment is reduced by approximately
10 percentage points after controlling for changes in ﬂeet size and its composition.
The results further show that, as predicted by our model, the ability to reduce payments during
periods of poor ﬁnancial performance – when renegotiation credibility is high – is particularly large
when liquidationvalues are low. This eﬀect is sizeable. For example, during periods of poor ﬁnancial
performance, a one standard deviation decrease in the number-of-operators redeployability measure
2decreases an airline’s lease payment by 20 percent compared to its contracted lease payments. Our
evidence is thus supportive of the ability of ﬁrms to strategically renegotiate their obligations
when ﬁrm performance is poor, insofar as ﬁrm payments are reduced when lessors’ outside options
deteriorate. In contrast, when an airline is not in ﬁnancial distress and hence its renegotiation
credibility is relativelylow, we ﬁnd that ﬂeet redeployabilityis either unrelated or slightlynegatively
related to lease payments, depending on the speciﬁcation.
We proceed by studying airline bankruptcies. Consistent with our previous results, during
bankruptcy, airlines are able to reduce lease payments substantially. Furthermore, the ability of
bankrupt airlines to reduce their lease payments is greater when their ﬂeets are less redeployable.
For example, during periods of bankruptcy, a one standard deviation decrease in the number-of-
operators redeployability measure decreases an airline’s lease payment by 22 percent compared to
its contracted lease payment.
We supplement our analysis by studying lease renegotiation out of bankruptcy. We ﬁnd that,
even out of bankruptcy, airlines in poor ﬁnancial condition can reduce their lease payments and
that lower ﬂeet redeployability enables these airlines to extract greater concessions from their
lessors. Finally, we use the attacks of 9/11 as an exogenous shock to airlines’ cash ﬂows and ﬂeet
liquidation values and ﬁnd that contractual lease obligations were reduced by approximately 13
percentage points.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section I analyzes a simple ﬁnancial contract-
renegotiation model. A case study that analyzes the acquisition of TWA by American Airlines in
2001 is presented in section II. Section III provides a description of our data sources and summary
statistics. Section IV describes the empirical analysis, and section V concludes.
I. The Model
In this section, we develop a simple model of ﬁnancial contract renegotiation based on Hart and
Moore (1994). Our main goals are to analyze the conditions under which a ﬁrm can credibly
commit to renegotiate its liabilities with outside claimholders, and to analyze the payoﬀs to parties
conditional on renegotiation occuring. We generate two intuitive predictions which are then tested
in the data. In order to assess the credibility of renegotiation, we follow Bergman and Callen (1991)
3in explicitly modeling the renegotiation process between the ﬁrm and its liability holders.3































Consider a ﬁrm (The “Lessee”) which has entered a contract to lease an asset for 2 periods from a
Lessor. The contract stipulates that the Lessee will pay the Lessor l1 at the end of period 1, and
l2 at the end of period 2. The Lessee will be using the asset to generate cash ﬂow C1 in period
1, and C2 in period 2. These cash ﬂows are not expropriable by the ﬁrm – an assumption which
approximates the situation faced by large publicly traded ﬁrms in the U.S. At the end of period 1,
the market value of the asset if liquidated is L, while at the end of period 2, this value is zero. We
assume that L<C 2, so that liquidation at t = 1 is ineﬃcient.
The evolution of the game is as follows. At date 1.5 after having obtained C1, the Lessee
decides whether to abide by the contract and pay the contracted payments, or instead to trigger
renegotiation with the Lessor.4 To understand the credibility of the threat to renegotiate, we
explicitly model the renegotiation process as a bargaining game in which the two parties engage in
3Our model is also related to Baird and Picker (1991) and Bebchuck and Chang (1992) who study bargaining
between claimholders in bankruptcy. Similarly, Eraslan (2006) develops and structurally estimates a multilateral
Chapter 11 bargaining game.
4We assume that the Lessee cannot pay out a dividend until all lease obligations are fulﬁlled. Our main results
are robust to this assumption.
4a series of alternating oﬀers as in Rubinstein (1982). If during the bargaining process either party
accepts an oﬀer of its counterpart, bargaining ends and a new contract is signed with the agreed
upon repayment schedule. Bargaining, however, is costly in that the value of the second period
cash ﬂow declines by an inﬁnitesimal amount between each successive round of oﬀers. This cost
can be thought of as arising from a lack of optimal management, whether intentional or not, during
the bargaining period.
If renegotiation is unsuccessful, in that the second period cash ﬂow has dwindled down to zero
while neither party has agreed to an oﬀer of its counterpart, a solution is imposed by a court.
According to this: (i) The Lessor repossesses the asset and can therefore sell it for L, and, (ii)
the court orders the Lessee to pay the Lessor damages D = min{C1,l 1 + l2 − L}.5 This amount
of damages guarantees that the Lessor obtains as payoﬀ either the full promised payments, or the
Lessee’s entire date 1 cash balance as well as the value L of the assets.
It should be noted that although cash ﬂows cannot be expropriated, under certain conditions
the Lessee will still be able to successfully renegotiate lease contracts and pay less than the original
stipulated obligation. This stems from the Lessee’s ability to credibly threaten the Lessor to forego
future cash ﬂows by accepting their loss during renegotiation, to the detriment of both parties.
C. Contract Renegotiation, Liquidation Values and Cash Flows
In this section we solve for the subgame perfect equilibrium (SPE) of the game to analyze the
conditions for contract renegotiation and the payoﬀs obtained therein. Since the game is one
of complete information, the SPE of the subgame beginning after the Lessee decides to trigger
renegotiation involves both parties immediately agreeing on a new repayment schedule. We show
in a Lemma in the Appendix that this involves a payoﬀ of 1
2(C2−L) to the Lessee and C1+1
2(C2+L)
to the Lessor. The following proposition, which is proved in the Appendix by simply comparing
the Lessee’s renegotiation payoﬀs to those from abiding by the contract, identiﬁes when the Lessee
will choose to trigger renegotiation.
Proposition 1. The subgame perfect equilibrium of the game is characterized by the following
two cases:
(a) If C1 + C2 <l 1 + l2, the Lessee always renegotiates the contract.
5In the event that the liquidation value, L, is greater than l1 + l2, damages are assumed to be zero.




(C2 + L) <l 1 + l2, (1)
and otherwise abides by the original contract, raising capital at t =1if necessary. In all cases, if
renegotiation occurs, payoﬀs to the parties are as in the lemma in the Appendix. If renegotiation
does not occur, the Lessee obtains (C1 + C2) − (l1 + l2) and the Lessor obtains (l1 + l2).
The intuition behind inequality (1) in Proposition 1 is that the Lessee can credibly renegotiate
the initial contract when C1, C2,a n dL are suﬃciently small compared to the contractually speciﬁed
payment l1 + l2. First, all else equal, when L or C1 are small, the Lessee’s eﬀective bargaining
position is high, since the Lessor’s outside option – to sell the repossessed asset for L and seize the
period one cash ﬂow C1 – is not very attractive. The Lessee can thus credibly commit to trigger
renegotiation, knowing that the Lessor will accept a more favorable payment schedule. Similarly,
the Lessee can credibly commit to renegotiate the lease contract only if C2 is suﬃciently low. This
is because the Lessee’s ability to obtain concessions in renegotiation stems from his willingness to
accept the reduction of the ﬁrm’s future earnings prospects during renegotiation, and in so doing,
harm the ﬁrm’s ability to repay the Lessor. However, if C2 is too high, the Lessee’s threat to accept
future cash ﬂow reduction is not credible, since in order to harm the ﬁrm’s ability to repay the
Lessor, a large fraction of the ﬁrm’s future earnings prospects would need to be lost. The Lessee
would thus prefer instead to simply pay the prespeciﬁed lease payments.6
Figure 1 displays the Lessee’s renegotiation choice in (C1,C 2) space. In area A, the ﬁrm is in
ﬁnancial distress (C1 + C2 <l 1 + l2), and hence, as stated in Proposition 1, can easily credibly
renegotiate lease payments to obtain a positive payoﬀ. In area B the ﬁrm is not in ﬁnancial distress
and condition (1) holds. Thus, because C1, C2 and L are small enough compared to the initially
speciﬁed contract payment, l1 + l2, the Lessee can credibly renegotiate a new, reduced payment
schedule. Intuitively, although the ﬁrm is not in ﬁnancial distress, its ﬁnancial position is poor
enough to allow the Lessee to credibly renegotiate lease payments. Finally, in area C, pre-speciﬁed
lease payments are relatively small compared to both the liquidation value, L, and current and
future ﬁrm cash ﬂows. Thus, in this area the Lessee cannot credibly trigger renegotiation, and
instead, abides by the originally signed contract.
6Less formally, when C2 is high, the Lessee’s threat to accept asset repossession and liquidation by the Lessor is
not credible because the asset is needed to generate the high C2 payoﬀ in period 2.
6The model generates two sets of predictions:
Prediction 1. All else equal, the credibility of contract renegotiation, and hence its likelihood,
will decrease with the Lessee’s current and future cash ﬂow.
Prediction 2. Firms’ ability to renegotiate down their lease payments when liquidation values are
low will be concentrated during periods of relatively poor ﬁnancial performance.
Both predictions are a direct result of Proposition 1. First, when C1 and C2 are relatively high,
condition (1) will not hold and so the ﬁrm will not be able to credibly threaten to renegotiate its
contracted lease payments. Thus, as Prediction 1 states, ﬁrms will be able to renegotiate ﬁnancial
contracts only when their ﬁnancial condition is suﬃciently poor. Prediction 2 states that ﬁrms will
be able to renegotiate and lower their lease payments when the liquidation value of their assets,
L, decreases, but that this eﬀect will be concentrated in times when ﬁrms’ ﬁnancial position is
relatively poor. This is because only then can ﬁrms credibly renegotiate their payments, enabling
changes in liquidation values to aﬀect changes in the parties’ payoﬀs.
II. The Acquisition of Trans World Airlines by American Airlines:
A Case Study
In this section, we brieﬂy describe the acquisition of Trans World Airlines (TWA) by American
Airlines (AA) in January 2001, and the lease renegotiation process that subsequently ensued. We
argue that AA had the ability to credibly threaten to reject many of TWA’s leases, and that the
outcome of the lease renegotiation in this case is consistent with the model presented in Section I.
A. TWA’s Financial Diﬃculties and American Airlines Purchase Plan
On January 10, 2001 TWA ﬁled a chapter 11 bankruptcy petition as part of a deal with AA. Under
the deal, AA acquired almost all of TWA’s assets by paying $625 million in cash and assuming
obligations of TWA that exceeded $5 billion. The acquisition marked the end of more than a decade
of ﬁnancial diﬃculties for TWA which included two previous Chapter 11 reorganizations.
AA purchased substantially all of TWA assets subject to section 363 of the Bankruptcy Code
which authorizes the sale of property of a debtor’s estate under certain conditions. Baird and
Rasmussen (2003) ﬁnd that asset sales subject to section 363 of the Bankruptcy Code account for
56% of the large businesses that completed their Chapter 11 proceedings in 2002.
7AA acquired a total of 173 aircraft from TWA, in addition to a new hub in St. Louis, key gates,
maintenance facilities, and a 26% stake in the Worldspan computer-reservations system. One of
the primary beneﬁts of the TWA acquisition was the complementarity between the ﬂeets of the
two airlines.7
B. American Airlines’s Threat to Reject TWA Leases.
Although AA assumed most of TWA’s obligations, it was not obligated by law to assume all lease
contracts. According to Section 365 of the bankruptcy code, AA had the ability to reject TWA’s
aircraft leases resulting in the leased aircraft being returned to the lessors and leaving the lessors
with an action for damages. Furthermore, upon rejection, lessor’s claim for damages would be
against TWA cash ﬂow. Consistent with prediction 1 of the model, since TWA had not generated
positive earnings for more than a decade, and by January 3, “TWA was down to its last $20 million
in cash” (Carey 2001), AA’s ability to threaten to reject the aircraft leases was deemed to be quite
credible. Indeed, according to Buhler (2003):
The aircraft market conditions, and the disparity between American’s credit and TWA’s
allowed American to approach the aircraft lessors and lenders with the choice of accept-
ing American’s purchase oﬀers/deeply discounted lease rates, or taking the aircraft back
in their then-current condition...To my knowledge, all of the lenders and lessors agreed,
resulting in new lease rates, in some cases 50 percent or more under TWA’s.
Moreover, since TWA’s ﬂeet was quite large, rejecting TWA’s leases could have ﬂooded the aircraft
market, thus forcing lessors to sell their repossessed aircraft at ‘ﬁre sale’ prices. Table 1 displays
the top-ten operators of each of the main aircraft types in TWA’s ﬂeet as of 1/10/2001: MD-80,
DC-9, Boeing 757, and Boeing 767. While all of these models are popular aircraft, AA was the top
user of MD-80s in the world (276 aircraft representing 23.45% of the total number of MD-80s in the
world), and the second largest user worldwide of both Boeing 757s (102 aircraft representing 10.81%
of total number of Boeing 757s), and Boeing 767s (70 aircraft representing 9.83% of total number
of Boeing 767s). Thus, AA was able to amplify the threat of ‘ﬁre sales’ by refusing to purchase
the repossessed MD-80s, Boeing 757s, and Boeing 767s from TWA’s lessors. The combination of
7There was a large overlap in aircraft type between by AA and TWA. Out of its ﬂeet of 191 aircraft, TWA operated
103 MD-80s, 27 Boeing 757s, and 16 Boeing 767s, whereas AA had a ﬂeet of 726 aircraft, including 276 MD-80s, 102
Boeing 757s, and 79 Boeing 767s.
8limited demand for a large number of aircraft and TWA’s low cash ﬂows increased the bargaining
position of AA vis-` a-vis TWA’s lessors during the lease renegotiation process.
C. Estimates of the Value of Lease Renegotiation
Eventually most of the DC-9s were rejected and the leases of the MD-80s, Boeing 757s, and Boeing
767s, were renegotiated. According to Buhler (2003):
When the American acquisition of the TWA assets closed in April 2001, American
assumed most of TWA’s leases and purchased a number of its aircraft. In TWA’s case,
the large number of aircraft created justiﬁable fears of a massive glut on the market if
American’s oﬀers were refused... The [TWA case] demonstrates one simple rule: the
bargaining positions of the parties and the value of the subject matter dictate the result.
We continue by estimating the value of the renegotiation to AA. We obtain data on current and
expected lease payments from the 10Ks of AA and TWA. Since airlines are required to report their
future lease obligations as speciﬁed by pre-existing lease contracts, we can compare the expected
lease expenses before the acquisition of TWA to the actual cost of the leases after the acquisition
was completed. We begin by estimating the expected lease obligations of TWA as of 12/31/2000.
Using TWA’s debt yields for diﬀerent maturities as reported in TWA’s 10K to discount TWA’s
future lease commitments (between 9.7% and 14.7%), we calculate the present value of TWA’s
future lease commitments to be $3,433 million (see Panel A of Table 2). Since AA assumed leases
on 78% of TWA’s seat capacity, absent renegotiation, we would expect the present value of AA’s
lease expenses to increase by 0.78× 3,433 = $2,677.6 million. This was not the case.
Panel B of Table 2 calculates the present value of the expected lease payments of AA from 2001
and onwards as of 12/31/2000, using a discount rate of 6.6% (corresponding to the average yield on
AA’s bonds during the year2000). To estimatethe increase in AA’s present value of lease obligations
during 2001, Panel C calculates the present value of AA’s actual 2001 lease payment combined with
the expected lease obligations from 2002 and onwards as of 12/31/2000.8 In calculating this value,
we adjust the diﬀerence between AA’s expected lease payments as of 12/31/2000 and the sum
of the actual payments during 2001 and the expected lease payments as of 12/31/2001 for the
8We use a discount rate of 7.7% that corresponds to the average yield of AA’s Enhanced Equipment Trust
Certiﬁcates (EETCs) in 2001 prior to the 9/11 attacks. This rate reﬂects the increase in the risk of AA during 2001
which was not subject to the 9/11 industry shock.
9number of AA’s aircraft that were dismissed during 2001.9 As can be seen from Panel C, while
AA assumed TWA’s leases with an estimated present value of $2,677 million, the present value of
AA’s lease expense increased by only $1,705.5 million. The diﬀerence, $972.1 million, representing
a cost reduction of 36.3%, is the estimate of the amount saved by AA due to successful lease
renegotiation.10
Our estimate is consistent with Buhler’s (2003) anecdotal evidence and suggests that, as our
model predicts, AA was able to accept a favorable payment schedule given its credible threat to
reject the leases due to TWA’s low cash ﬂow and the threat to ﬂood the market with aircraft. The
next sections provide a formal empirical analysis of these eﬀects in the U.S. airline industry.
III. Data and Summary Statistics
This section describes the data sources used in our empirical analysis and outlines summary statis-
tics for both airline characteristics and measures of ﬂeet redeployability.
A. Airline Characteristics
To construct our sample, we collect data from a number of sources. We start with all publicly
traded ﬁrms with a four-digit SIC code equal to 4512 (Scheduled Air Transportation) during the
period 1995-2005. We then search for all annual reports of each of these ﬁrms as recorded in the
online SEC-Edgar database. From each annual report, we collect the following information.
First, we construct an account of the composition of each airline’s leased ﬂeet. We record the
number of aircraft which are leased by each airline by aircraft type. Second, from the income state-
ment, we record the amount paid by each airline in the form of aircraft lease expenses.11 Third,
from each annual report, we collect information on future contracted lease payments owed by air-
lines. According to FAS regulation 13, a ﬁrm must report its pre-existing lease commitments for
each of the ﬁve years following the ﬁling of an annual report, as well as the sum of future scheduled
lease commitments from year six and on. We collect for each airline-year the schedule of future
contracted lease payments owed by each airline. Finally, we use Thomson’s SDC Platinum Restruc-
9AA dismissed about 3% of its seats capacity during 2001.
10It should be noted that the diﬀerence between the lease expenses of AA and TWA are not driven by the superior
credit quality of AA since risk-adjusted discount rates are used in the present value calculations.
11In a few cases, ﬁrms do not report aircraft lease payments separately from other lease payments – such as those
for ground facilities – and instead report the value of aggregate lease payments. Since we are interested in aircraft
lease payments, the relevant data for these ﬁrms is coded as missing.
10turing database to identify airlines that are in Chapter 7 or Chapter 11 bankruptcy procedures.
Our ﬁnal sample consists of 212 airline-year observations, representing 25 airlines during the period
1995 to 2005.
Table 3 displays descriptive statistics for a selected set of variables. As the table demonstrates,
annual lease payments are sizeable, with mean annual lease payment equaling $250.4millionand the
maximum annual lease payment exceeding $1 billion. Annual lease payments represent, on average,
14.9% of airline’s assets with a standard deviation of 18.5%. The mean number of aircraft leased
by airlines in our sample is 139, of which, on average, 7 percent were wide-bodied aircraft.12 The
maximum number of leased aircraft in our sample is 483 (Continental Airlines in 2005). The mean
number of total seats in an airline’s leased ﬂeet is 20,472.1, while the average of airline proﬁtability
(operating income before depreciation divided by the book value of assets) is 9.13%.
To measure the degree of lease contract concessions obtained by airlines, we construct three
variables related to lease payments. Our ﬁrst, and main, measure is the ratio of actual lease
payments paid during year t to the minimum expected year t lease payment as contracted in year
t − 1( Actual/Expected−1). As described above, the denominator of this ratio is taken from the
airlines’ 10K statements. Table 3 shows that the mean ratio of actual to minimum expected lease
payment in the full sample is 1.05. On average, lease payments are greater than the previous year’s
minimum expected lease payment, indicating increased payments due to ﬂeet growth. Our second
measure is simply the rate of change of lease payments from year t − 1t oy e a rt.T a b l e 3 s h o w s
that this average rate is 9.1%. The ﬁnal measure we use to measure possible renegotiation of lease
payments is simply the annual lease payments divided by the book value of assets.
As a measure of ﬁnancial diﬃculties we deﬁne a variable Low Cash that equals one for airlines
in which cash ﬂow from operations (income before extraordinary items + depreciation and amor-
tization) plus cash balances are less than their interest expense, and zero otherwise.13 There are
25 airline-year observations with Low Cash = 1, representing 11.8% of our sample. Our results
are qualitatively unchanged when proxying for ﬁnancial diﬃculties using a dummy variable which
equals one when cash ﬂow from operations are negative.
12A wide-bodied aircraft is an aircraft with passenger seats divided by two lengthwise aisles such as a Boeing 747
or an Airbus 300.
13Asquith, Gertner, and Scharfstein (1994) use similar methodology to identify ﬁrms in ﬁnancial distress.
11B. Redeployability Measures
Due to economies of scale in ﬂeet operation, airlines tend to limit the number of aircraft types which
they operate in order to reduce costs associated with pilot training, maintenance, and spare parts.
We take advantage of this fact in developing our measures of redeployability by assuming that the
potential secondary market buyers of any given type of aircraft are likely to be airlines already
operating the same type of aircraft. According to Pulvino (1998), the market for used commercial
aircraft is ‘extremely thin’, with approximately 20 used commercial aircraft transactions per month
worldwide. Likewise, Gavazza (2006) ﬁnds that between May 2002 and April 2003, 720 commercial
aircraft were traded, representing 5.8% of the total stock of commercial aircraft. The thinness of
the market for used aircraft reinforces the importance of the size of the set of potential buyers in
determining aircraft redeployability.
Our approach to measuring redeployability is motivated by the industry equilibrium model of
Shleifer and Vishny (1992), and is similar to the empirical approach developed in Benmelech (2008)
for 19th century American railroads, and to Gavazza (2006) for U.S. aircraft. Benmelech (2006)
exploits the diversity of track gauges in 19th century American railroads to identify potential buyers
for railroad tracks and rolling stock. Gavazza (2007) uses the number of aircraft per type and the
number of operators per type to proxy for asset liquidity.
B.1 Proxies for Aircraft Redeployability
We use the Ascend CASE database which contains ownership and operating information about all
commercial aircraft worldwide to construct our measures of airline ﬂeet redeployability. We begin
by constructing three redeployability measures at the yearly level for each aircraft type, where
aircraft type is deﬁned using the broad-type category in the Ascend CASE database. To do so, we
compute for every sample-year 1) the number of aircraft per type; 2) the number of operators per
type, and 3) the number of operators who operate at least 5 aircraft per type. In calculating these
three redeployability measures, we disregard airlines who are in bankruptcy (as deﬁned in the SDC
bankruptcy database), since their ﬁnancial position most likely precludes them from serving as
potential aircraft buyers. This process yields three redeployability measures for each aircraft-type
and each sample-year.
To construct the redeployability measures for an entire ﬂeet of an airline, we aggregate the
aircraft-type redeployabilitymeasures across all leased aircraft in each airline’sﬂeet. Speciﬁcally, we
12deﬁne the redeployabilityof an airline’s leased ﬂeet to be the weighted average of the redeployability
index corresponding to each of the leased aircraft in the airline’s ﬂeet. We calculate in this manner
three measures of ﬂeet redeployability corresponding to each of the three measures of aircraft-type

























where i represents an airline ﬂeet, t represents a sample year, a denotes an aircraft type, and ωi,t,a
is deﬁned as





Since we do not have data on aircraft market values, we use the number of seats in an aircraft model
as a proxy for its size (and value) in our weighted average calculations. Furthermore, in calculating
the ﬁrst redeployability measure, since we want to account for the residual demand for the aircraft
in each ﬂeet, we do not include each airline’s own aircraft. Likewise, in our number-of-operators
based proxies we do not count the airline for which we calculate the measure.
The TWA case suggests that the ﬂeets of large airlines are less sellable. Using the Ascend
CASE database we therefore construct a fourth measure of redeployability as the ratio between the
number of leased aircraft per type that an airline has and the total number of aircraft per type. As
before, to construct the fourth proxy at the airline-ﬂeet level, we calculate the weighted average of





where numberof aircraftt,a is the number of worldwide aircraft of type a in year t.14 Panel
A of Table 4 presents descriptive statistics for the redeployability proxies. As can be seen, the
14It should be noted that when the ﬂeet-share redeployability measure is high, the ﬂeet is less redeployable.
13redeployability measure based on aircraft number has an average value of 1,217.2 with a median
of 972.9. There are on average 152.7 potential buyers for an airline’s leased aircraft but only 49.9
when operators with more than 5 aircraft of the same type are considered (the median number
is 41.8). Moreover, on average, an airline in our sample operates 7.57% of the world’s ﬂeet of an
aircraft type, with a median of 4.4%. Finally, as panel B of Table 4 shows, our redeployability
measures are highly correlated.15
Table 5 lists examples of the leased aircraft and the corresponding redeployability measures of
selected airlines in 2005. As Table 5 demonstrates, among the airlines in the table, Alaska Airlines
had the most redeployable ﬂeet, while AirTran had the least redeployable ﬂeet in 2005. This is
explained by the fact that Alaska Airlines leased some of the most widely used aircraft (31 B737-
400, 5 B737-700, and 1 B737-800), while AirTran’s leased ﬂeet was dominated by 77 B717-200s –
a low redeployability aircraft with only 155 planes in active operation worldwide in 2005.
IV. Empirical Analysis
In this section we analyze empirically the ability of airlines to renegotiate their contractual lease
obligations. Our goal is to understand the factors that enable airlines to extract concessions in
renegotiation by holding up their lessors, and to estimate the magnitude of the concessions that
airlines obtain.
A. Redeployability and Endogeneity
One concern in using our redeployability measures as proxies for the strength of airlines’ bargaining
positions vis-` a-vis their lessors is that the redeployability of an airline’s aircraft is endogenous and
driven by growth opportunities or proﬁtability.
While we control in our regressions for airline characteristics, and our identiﬁcation strategy is
based on within-airlines estimates using airlines ﬁxed-eﬀects, the endogeneity of the redeployability
measures is ultimately an empirical question. We test the hypothesis that ﬂeet redeployability
is correlated with airline characteristics and report the results in the Appendix (Table A1). We
regress each of our four redeployability measures on airline characteristics: sales, proﬁtability, ﬂeet
size as measured by the total number of seats in an airline’s leased ﬂeet, the fraction of wide-bodied
15We include each of the redeployability measures separately in our regression analysis to avoid a multicollinearity
problem.
14aircraft leased by the airline, and a dummy variable that equals 1 for airlines in bankruptcy and zero
otherwise. All regressions include year and airline ﬁxed-eﬀects and standard errors are clustered by
airline. As can be seen, none of the explanatory variables are statistically signiﬁcant in explaining
aircraft redeployability.16 We do not include the market-to-book ratio as an explanatory variable
in the regressions in Table VI since several airlines do not have publicly traded equity.17
The fact that our redeployability measures are not correlated with airline characteristics such
as size, proﬁtability, bankruptcy, and market-to-book measures, alleviates concerns about the en-
dogeneity of our redeployability measures and their correlation with future growth opportunities
and ﬁnancial performance. Furthermore, in our subsequent regression analysis we include airline
characteristics and airline ﬁxed-eﬀects to control for airline heterogeneity that potentially drives
aircraft redeployability.
B. Financial Condition, Lease Renegotiation and Aircraft Redeployability
Our model predicts that ﬁrms can credibly renegotiate scheduled payments only when their ﬁnan-
cial condition is relatively poor. We use years in which airlines’ cash ﬂow from operations plus
cash balances are less than their interest expense as a proxy for periods in which their threat to
renegotiate lease payments is credible (LowCash = 1). While renegotiation itself is unobservable,
we test the model’s prediction by estimating the outcomes of contract renegotiation. To do so,
we use the ratio of an airline’s actual lease payments to its minimum expected lease payments
calculated as of the previous year (Actual/Expected−1) as our main dependent variable.
Since the ratio of an airline’s actual lease payments to its previous year’s minimum expected
lease payments may increase (decrease) mechanically when airlines expand (reduce) their leased
ﬂeet size, we control in our regression analysis for the yearly change in the total number of seats
in an airline’s leased ﬂeet.18 In addition, we control for the total seats in the leased ﬂeet, the
square of the total seats in the leased ﬂeet, and the composition of the ﬂeet as captured by the
fraction of wide-bodied aircraft in the ﬂeet. We hypothesize that after controlling for ﬂeet change,
ﬂeet composition, ﬂeet size and higher order terms, changes in (Actual/Expected−1) should be
driven by contract renegotiation. To conﬁrm this hypothesis, we conduct keyword searches of the
16To alleviate a multicollinearity concern, we also include each of the regressors individually for each of the rede-
ployability measures and ﬁnd similar results (not reported).
17In unreported regressions we included market-to-book for the sub-sample of airlines with data on equity prices
and found no relation between market-to-book and the redeployability measures.
18As a robustness test we also scale Actual/Expected−1 by the yearly change in seat size and ﬁnd similar results.
15ﬁnancial reports of the airlines in our sample and ﬁnd 20 cases in which airlines report that they have
renegotiated aircraft leases. We ﬁnd that the mean ratio of Actual/Expected−1 for airlines that
do not report lease renegotiation is 1.07, while that of airlines that do report lease renegotiation
in their ﬁnancial reports is 0.91 (t-statistic for an equal means test=2.38). Furthermore, when
we restrict our sample to airlines with LowCash=1, the mean of Actual/Expected−1 is 0.99 for
airlines that do not report lease renegotiation, compared to 0.76 for airlines that do report lease
renegotiation in their ﬁnancial reports (t-statistic for an equal means test=1.79). Thus, conﬁrming
our Actual/Expected−1 renegotiation measure, airlines that report lease renegotiation pay in lease
expenses an amount smaller than their (previous year’s) contracted lease payments. Hence, we
conclude that after controlling for a battery of ﬂeet covariates that likely soak up changes in lease
payments that may be unrelated to renegotiations, changes in our dependent variable capture
contract renegotiations.
We run diﬀerent speciﬁcations of the following baseline regression which includes an interaction
term between each of the four measures of ﬂeet redeployability and the LowCash dummy variable:
(Actual/Expected−1)it = α × LowCashit + β × Redeployabilityit
+ γ × Redeployabilityit × LowCashit + Xitλ + ytψ + aiθ +  it, (2)
where (Actual/Expected−1)it is the ratio of an airline’s actual lease expenses to its previous year’s
minimum expected lease payments, LowCashit is a dummy variable indicating whether the sum
of cash ﬂow from operations and cash balances of airline i is less than its interest expense in year
t, Redeployabilityit is one of our four measures of the redeployability of an airline’s ﬂeet, and
Redeployabilityit × LowCashit is an interaction term between LowCash and each of the four
redeployability measures. yt is a vector of year ﬁxed-eﬀects, ai is a vector of airline ﬁxed-eﬀects,
and Xit is a vector of control variables that include the natural logarithm of the airline’s sales, the
size of the airline’s leased ﬂeet as measured by the total number of passenger seats in the airline’s
leased aircraft, the square of size of the airline’s leased ﬂeet, the percentage change in the size of
the airline’s leased ﬂeet, and the percent of wide bodied aircraft in an airline’s ﬂeet. The ﬁrst four
columns in Table 6 report the results of Regression 2 for each of our four measures of redeployability,
while the next four columns of Table 6 report the results of the regressions which include also airline
ﬁxed-eﬀects. All regressions include robust standard errors that assume group-wise clustering at
the airline level.
16Consistent with Prediction 1, LowCash is associated with a drop in lease payments in three out
of the four redeployability measures (the coeﬃcient using the ﬂeet-share redeployability measure
is negative but not statistically signiﬁcant). The coeﬃcients on the ﬁrst four columns of Table 6
indicate that during years of poor ﬁnancial performance, the average ratio of an airline’s actual lease
payment to its minimum expected payment is reduced by approximately 10 percentage points.19
Including airline ﬁxed-eﬀects does not qualitatively change the results, although the statistical
signiﬁcance is reduced.
We test Prediction 2 of the model by employing an interaction term between Redeployabilityit
and the LowCash variable. As can be seen in Table 6, the coeﬃcients on the non-interacted rede-
ployabilitymeasures indicate eithera negative relationbetween ﬂeet redeployabilityand Actual/Expected−1
or a relation that is not statistically diﬀerent from zero. Thus, during years of relatively good ﬁ-
nancial performance (LowCash = 0), we ﬁnd that airlines are not able to obtain concessions from
their lessors and reduce their lease payments when the redeployability of their assets is low.20
However, consistent with Prediction 2 of the model, the results indicate that reduced ﬂeet rede-
ployability is associated with lower lease payments when an airline’s ﬁnancial position is relatively
poor. As the interaction term between redeployability and LowCash indicates, both with and
without airline ﬁxed-eﬀects, in years of poor ﬁnancial performance the relation between redeploy-
ability and Actual/Expected−1 is now positive using three of our four measures of redeployability
(number of aircraft, number of operators, and number of large operators). Put diﬀerently, when the
threat to renegotiate is more credible, reductions in ﬂeet redeployability measures are associated
with reductions in actual lease payments. Using the airline ﬁxed-eﬀect speciﬁcation, we ﬁnd that
when LowCash=1, a one standard deviation decrease in the redeployability measures decreases
an airline’s lease payment by approximately 20 percentage points as compared to its minimum
expected lease payment.21 The interaction between the fourth redeployability measure, ﬂeet-share,
and the LowCash dummy variable implies a similar positive relation between redeployability and
19This economic eﬀect is calculated at the sample mean of each redeployability measure.
20One possible explanation for the negative relation between redeployability and (Actual/Expected−1) found in
the speciﬁcations without airline ﬁxed-eﬀects is that ﬁrms with highly redeployable ﬂeets have lower lease expenses.
Lessors understand that upon default it will be easier to redeploy the aircraft, and therefore charge lessees less up
front. This argument is consistent with Benmelech and Bergman (2008) who ﬁnd that debt tranches that are secured
by more redeployable aircrafts have lower credit spreads.
21Economic magnitudes throughout the paper take into account the total diﬀerential of both the level and the
interaction term when appropriate. We also test for the statistical signiﬁcance of the sum of the two coeﬃcients and
ﬁnd that in the speciﬁcations that include ﬁrm ﬁxed-eﬀects they are statistically signiﬁcant.
17Actual/Expected−1 but this is not statistically signiﬁcant.22 In unreported results we repeat our
analysis using as a dependent variable the ratio between actual year t l e a s ep a y m e n t sa n dt h ey e a r
t − 2 expected lease payments. We continue to ﬁnd a positive and signiﬁcant coeﬃcient on the
interaction term between redeployability and the LowCash dummy variable.
In the last three columns of Table 6 we weight airlines by their cash ﬂow from operations
plus cash balances when constructing the redeployability measures. Following Shleifer and Vishny
(1992), this captures the notion that the ﬁnancial condition of potential buyers is of importance in
determining demand for assets.23 Since accounting data is only available for publicly traded ﬁrms,
this procedure has the drawback that it does not allow inclusion of private airlines when calculating
the aircraft redeployability measures. Still, as can be seen from the last three columns of Table
6, conditional on Low Cash=1 we continue to ﬁnd a positive relation between (weighted) ﬂeet
redeployability and Actual/Expected−1 for three of the four redeployability measures.24 Indeed,
conditional on poor ﬁnancial performance, the coeﬃcients imply that a one standard deviation
decrease in the redeployability measures reduces actual compared to expected lease payments by
between 11.8 and 17.5 percentage points.
For robustness, we repeat our analysis using both lease payments scaled by assets, or changes
in lease payments as dependent variables and report the results in Table 7. In the ﬁrst 4 columns
of Table 7 we use lease expenses scaled by assets as our dependent variable. We ﬁnd that after
controlling for airline ﬁxed-eﬀects, there is no statistically signiﬁcant relation between the level of
lease payments and the Low Cash dummy variable, or the redeployability measures. However, our
main result holds: the interaction between redeployability and LowCash is positive and statisti-
cally signiﬁcant at the 1 percent level in three out of four cases. Thus, consistent with Prediction 2,
conditional on poor ﬁnancial performance – as proxied by LowCash=1 – reductions in ﬂeet rede-
ployability are associated with reductions in (scaled) lease payments. Indeed, a standard deviation
reduction in ﬂeet redeployability reduces the ratio of lease payments to assets by between 3.2 to
4.6 percentage points.
Likewise, in the last four columns of Table 7 we use the one-year change in lease payments as
22The ﬁrm ﬁxed-eﬀects capture (non time-varying) unobserved diﬀerences in ﬁrms’ ability to renegotiate with
lessors. These include management’s reputation for ‘toughness’ in renegotiation, managerial quality, or the strength
of the employee union in the ﬁrm.
23Our original unweighted redeployability measures also follow this notion in that when calculating the redeploya-
bility measures we ignore airlines in bankruptcy as a source of potential demand for aircraft.
24As above, the coeﬃcient on ﬂeet-share is not statistically signiﬁcant, and for brevity, is not reported in Table 6.
18our dependent variable. Since in these regressions our dependent variable is a rate of change we
do not include airline ﬁxed-eﬀects. Consistent with Prediction 1 and 2, we ﬁnd a robust negative
relation between the LowCash dummy variable and the yearly change in lease payments for three
out of the four redeployability measures. During years when Low Cash equals one, the yearly
change in lease payments is reduced by between 10.8 and 11.4 percentage points as compared
to years when LowCash is zero. Importantly, consistent with Prediction 2, we ﬁnd that the
interaction between redeployability and LowCash is positive and statistically signiﬁcant for three
out of the four redeployability measures. Therefore, when airlines are doing poorly, reductions in
ﬂeet redeployability are associated with reductions in lease payments. A one standard deviation
reduction in the redeployability measures reduces the change in lease payments by between 3.5 and
4 percentage points.
C. Lease Renegotiation in Bankruptcy
We continue our analysis by studying airline bankruptcies. We use years in which an airline is in
bankruptcy as a proxy for periods in which airlines can credibly renegotiate their lease payments.
While there is a limited number of airline bankruptcies in our sample,25 given the importance of
airline bankruptcies, and since some of the airlines who ﬁle for Chapter 11 are among the largest
in the industry, we devote a subsection for lease renegotiation in bankruptcy. Furthermore, we
hypothesize that since a lessee’s threat to reject its leases and return aircraft to lessors is more
credible during bankruptcy, the eﬀect of redeployability on the ability to obtain concessions from
lessors in lease renegotiation will be stronger than that found in the previous section.
Table 8 presents the results of running the followingregressionfor each of the four redeployability
measures:
(Actual/Expected−1)it = α × Bankruptcyit + β × Redeployabilityit + γ × Seatsit × Bankruptcyit
+ σ × Redeployabilityit × Bankruptcyit + Xitλ + ytψ + aiθ +  it, (3)
where Bankruptcy is a dummy variable taking on the value of one in those years in which an airline
is under the protection of Chapter 11, and zero otherwise. Seatsit is the total number of seats in an
25We include both bankruptcies of U.S. Airways (2002-2003, and 2004-2005), and the bankruptcies of ATA, Comair
Delta Airlines, Mair, Northwest, and United Airlines. We were not able to obtain data for the second bankruptcy of
TWA (1995), and for the bankruptcies of Hawaiian Airlines and Tower. We do not include the third bankruptcy of
TWA since it was acquired by American Airlines.
19airline’s leased ﬂeet, Seatsit×Bankruptcyit is an interactionterm between Bankruptcy and Seatsit,
and the rest of the variables are identical to those in Regression 2. Consistent with our model,
during bankruptcy, the relation between redeployability and Actual/Expected−1 is positive using
all four measures of redeployability. Also, as hypothesized, consistent with a more credible threat
of lease rejection, the eﬀect of reduced ﬂeet redeployability is generally stronger in bankruptcy as
compared to in periods when Low Cash=1. In the speciﬁcations without airline ﬁxed-eﬀects, we
ﬁnd that in bankruptcy, a one standard deviation decrease in the ﬂeet redeployability measures
decreases an airline’s lease payments by between 30 and 49 percentage points as compared to its
contractual lease payment. In the speciﬁcations which include airline ﬁxed-eﬀects this eﬀect is
between 22.1 percentage points (number-of-operators redeployability measure) and 32.4 percentage
points (ﬂeet-share redeployability measure). The ﬂeet-share measure captures an airline’s threat
to reject leases on a massive scale – a threat that is most credible in bankruptcy. Thus, as opposed
to when using the LowCash variable, when proxying for poor ﬁnancial performance using the
bankruptcy dummy variable, ﬂeet-share is statistically signiﬁcant.
Finally, in Table 8 we also include the interaction between ﬂeet size and the Bankruptcyit vari-
able to capture the possibility that airlines with large ﬂeets can extract concessions by threatening
their lessors with massive liquidation as in the case of TWA’s acquisition. We ﬁnd support for this
hypothesis in that the coeﬃcient on this interaction variable is negative in all eight speciﬁcations,
and is statistically signiﬁcant in ﬁve of them. .
D. Lease Renegotiation out of Bankruptcy
We now test whether our results are driven solely by the ability of ﬁrms to renegotiate while in
bankruptcy, by including only those airline-years in which airlines are outside of bankruptcy. The
results are presented in the ﬁrst four columns of Table 9.
Our results continue to hold when focusing only on airlines out of bankruptcy: First, as in
Table 6, the Low Cash dummy variable is negatively related to Actual/Expected−1 in three of the
four redeployability measures. Second, and more importantly, amongst airlines with Low Cash=1,
there is a positive relation between redeployability and the amount of actual compared to expected
lease payments in three of the four redeployability measures. Thus, we ﬁnd that, even outside of
bankruptcy, airlines can renegotiate with their lessors and cut their lease rates when their ﬂeets are
less redeployable and their ﬁnancial condition is suﬃciently poor.
20E. Large Concessions
As an additional test of our model, we proxy for renegotiation using a dummy variable which takes
on a value of zero when Actual/Expected−1, is less than one, and equals one otherwise. A zero
value of the dummy variable represents cases in which airlines paid an amount smaller than their
minimum contracted lease payment.26 We repeat the analysis in Regression 2 using a probit model
with this dummy variable as a dependent variable.27
The last four columns of Table 9 present the results. As can be seen, our results are un-
changed: Consistent with Prediction 1, in three of the four speciﬁcations airlines in poor ﬁnancial
condition are more likely to obtain concessions, as evidenced by a higher probability of having a
ratio of Actual/Expected−1 which is less than one. Consistent with Prediction 2, conditional on
Low Cash=1, reductions in all of the four redeployability measures are associated with a greater
likelihood that an airline’s lease payments are smaller than its minimum contracted lease payments.
The coeﬃcients indicate that a standard deviation reduction in the redeployability measures in-
creases the likelihood of lease renegotiation by between 14.2 and 36.4 percentage points, represent-
ing an increase of between 23.9 and 61.1 percent relative to the unconditional mean event of large
concessions.
F. 9/11 and Lease Renegotiations
Finally, we document the eﬀect of the September 11, 2001 attacks on airline lease renegotiation.
The 9/11 attacks shook the American airline industry drastically and aﬀected both cash ﬂows
and liquidation values in the industry. Average proﬁtability of airlines in our sample was 13.31%
in the period 1994-2000, and only 4.77% in the period 2001-2005 (t-statistic for an equal means
test=3.86). Similarly, liquidation values of aircrafts declined sharply after 9/11:
Prices for used jets are down as much as 40% since 2000, their lowest level in at least 15
years...The soft market for airplanes gives bankrupt airlines tremendous leverage when
it comes to renegotiating their leases.28
26In unreported results, we repeat this exercise with a 0.9 cutoﬀ threshold for Actual/Expected−1 and obtain
similar results.
27We do not include airline ﬁxed-eﬀects in the probit speciﬁcation given the incidental parameters problem a ﬁxed-
eﬀects probit introduces (Wooldridge 2002). We ﬁnd similar results using a linear probability model with airline
ﬁxed-eﬀects.
28“The Great Airline Leasing Disaster”, Fortune Magazine, January 20, 2003.
21We examine the implications of the 9/11 attacks for lease renegotiations. The attacks were an
exogenous shock to the airline industry that aﬀected both airlines cash ﬂows and liquidation values.
Since we cannot separate the eﬀects of the exogenous 9/11 shock on liquidation values and cash
ﬂows, we repeat the analysis in Regression 2 using (Actual/Expected−1) as our dependent variable
and include a dummy variable that equals one for the years 2001-2005 (Post 9/11), and zero
otherwise. As Table 10 demonstrates, the coeﬃcients on the Post 9/11 dummy variable suggest
that contractual lease obligations were reduced by approximately 13.0 percentage points (t-stats
between -1.96 and -3.02). Furthermore, all our results hold after controlling for the Post 9/11
dummy. Thus, the exogenous shock of the 9/11 attacks that aﬀected both cash ﬂows and liquidation
values had a large impact on lease contract renegotiations.
V. Conclusion
In this paper we analyze theoretically and empirically ﬁrms’ ability to renegotiate ﬁnancial obliga-
tions from an incomplete contracting perspective. We provide a simple model showing that ﬁrms
will be able to credibly renegotiate for better terms only when their ﬁnancial position is relatively
poor, that ﬁrms’ ability to reduce their pre-speciﬁed commitments will increase when the liquida-
tion values of their assets decrease, but, importantly, that this eﬀect will be concentrated in those
times when renegotiation is credible. We proceed by analyzing lease renegotiation in a sample
of publicly traded, U.S. airlines. Our empirical results indicate that, consistent with the model,
airlines in relatively poor ﬁnancial position are able to renegotiate and reduce their lease payments
with lessors. Furthermore, using measures of ﬂeet redeployability as a proxy for the liquidation
value lessors would obtain upon the default of an aircraft lease, we show that when airlines are in
poor ﬁnancial condition, lower ﬂeet redeployability increases their ability to reduce lease payments.
Our evidence supports the incomplete contracting literature in that the ability of ﬁrms to rene-
gotiate their ﬁnancial commitments depends heavily on their bargaining position vis-` a-vis liability
holders. This bargaining position is determined, in turn, by both the credibility of threats made
during renegotiation and by the outside option of the bargaining parties.
22VI. Appendix
Proof. In this appendix we solve for the SPE of the subgame beginning after the Lessee has decided
to trigger renegotiation. In doing so, we need only consider the case when C1 + L<l 1 +l2.W h e n
this inequality does not hold, the Lessee clearly never triggers renegotiation since the Lessor can
obtain full repayment through the court imposed solution. We prove the following lemma:
Lemma. Assuming that C1 + L<l 1 + l2, then in the SPE of the subgame that begins after the
Lessee triggers renegotiation, the Lessee immediately oﬀers the Lessor a new schedule of payments
(p1,p 2) with p1 + p2 = C1 + 1
2(C2 + L) and p1 ≤ C1. The Lessor accepts the oﬀer, so that payoﬀs
to the parties are as follows: The Lessee obtains 1
2(C2−L), and the Lessor obtains C1 + 1
2(C2+L).
Proof. The lemma is a particular example of a standard result in alternating oﬀers games (see
e.g. Rubenstein 1982) which shows that under certain conditions, the axiomatic Nash bargaining
solution coincides with the subgame perfect equilibrium of the alternating oﬀer game. The proof is
by backward induction. First, suppose that the value of the second period cash ﬂow has deteriorated
to a level below L. In this case, the only oﬀer that the Lessor will accept is one in which the Lessee
liquidates the ﬁrm and pays out all proceeds, along with C1, to the Lessor, for a total payment of
C1 +L. This is because of the fact that the Lessor can guarantee C1 +L by refusing all oﬀers and
waiting for the court imposed solution, while the Lessee cannot oﬀer more than this amount due
to the deterioration of the second period cash ﬂow.29
By backward induction, to solve for the subgame perfect equilibrium we can consider a revised
game in which the subgame followingthe point in which second period cash ﬂow equals L is replaced
with a terminal node having a payoﬀ of C1 + L to the Lessor and a payoﬀ of zero to the Lessee.
Consider, therefore, the game in which after a rejection by either party, period 2 cash ﬂow is reduced
by (1/N)∗ (C2 − L) (with N large) so that after N rejected oﬀers, period 2 cash ﬂow equals L and
parties receive their terminal payoﬀs of C1 + L and zero. Assume that, without loss of generality,
the Lessor makes the ﬁnal oﬀer prior to second period cash ﬂow deteriorating to L and that N is
even. Finally, for convenience, we number the N rounds of alternating oﬀers in reverse order with
round N referring to the round in which the ﬁrst oﬀer is made, and round N referring to the round
in which the last oﬀer is made, i.e. prior to second period cash ﬂow deteriorating to L. Because
the Lessee is not allowed to pay dividends until all lease obligations are fulﬁlled, we can analyze
29Since C1 + L is assumed to be less than l1 + l2, the lessee obtains C1 + L under the court imposed solution.
23repayment schedules (p1,p 2) b a s e do nt h e i rs u m(p1 + p2). It should also be noted that since cash
ﬂows obtained by the ﬁrm are not expropriable, at t =2t h eL e s s e ew i l ln e v e rb ea b l et or e n e g o t i a t e
lease payments.
In the last round of the alternating oﬀer process (round 1), second period cash ﬂow equals
L+(1/N)∗(C2−L). The Lessor’s optimal repayment-schedule oﬀer has p1+p2 = C1 +L+(1/N)∗
(C2 − L), which leaves zero for the Lessee. It is optimal because the Lessee is indiﬀerent between
accepting this oﬀer and refusing it, since if he refuses, cash ﬂow will deteriorate to L and he will
obtain a terminal payoﬀ of zero anyway. Without loss of generality we assume that the Lessee
accepts the oﬀer. In round 2, in which it is the Lessee’s turn to make an oﬀer, second period cash
ﬂow equals L+(2/N)∗(C2 −L). In order to induce the lessor to accept a round 2 oﬀer, the lessee
must oﬀer the lessor a payment schedule (p1,p 2) with p1 +p2 ≥ C1 + L+(1/N)∗(C2 −L),a st h i s
is what the Lessor can guarantee by refusing the round 2 oﬀer and proceeding to round 1. The
Lessee therefore oﬀers p1+p2 = C1 +L+(1/N)∗(C2 −L) leaving (1/N)∗(C2−L) for himself, and
the Lessor accepts. The backward induction solution continues to unravel in a similar manner; in
round i, the party making the oﬀer – be it Lessor or Lessee – oﬀers to his counterpart the amount
that the counterpart will obtain in round i − 1 and keeps the remaining surplus to himself. Since
in each round no rents are left on the table, every period the oﬀerer will increase his payoﬀ by
(1/N) ∗ (C2 − L), while the oﬀeree will see no change in his payoﬀ as compared to the previous
round. By induction, therefore, at every even numbered round i, the subgame perfect equilibria
has the Lessee oﬀering the Lessor a repayment schedule of p1+p2 = C1+L+(i/2N)∗(C2−L),a n d
the Lessor accepting. Thus, at round N (the ﬁrst round), the Lessor oﬀers the Lessee a payment
schedule with a total payment of C1 + L+1 /2(C2 −L). Payoﬀs to the parties are as in Lemma 1.
Next, we prove Proposition 1 in Section I. If the lessee is in ﬁnancial distress in that (C1+C2) <
(l1 + l2), he will obviously choose to renegotiate and obtain a strictly positive payoﬀ rather than
abide by the original contract and obtain a payoﬀ of zero. In contrast, when the Lessee is not in
ﬁnancial distress, he will trigger renegotiation when his payoﬀ from doing so, 1
2(C2 −L), is greater
than his payoﬀ from abiding by the contract (C1 +C2) −(l1 − l2). This can be rearranged to yield
Equation 1 of Proposition 1. If renegotiation does not occur and C1 <l 1,t h eo n l yw a yt op a yl1
at t=1 is by raising additional capital against t=2 cash ﬂow. This is feasible, however, since case
(b) of the proposition has C1 + C2 >l 1 + l2.
24Table A1
Redeployability and Airline Characteristics
This table regresses ﬂeet redeployability measures on airline characteristics. Redeployability (aircraft)
is the number of aircraft per type; Redeployability (operators) is the number of operators per type,
Redeployability (≥ 5 aircraft) is the number of operators who operate at least 5 aircraft per type. Sales is
the logarithm of annual airline sales. Seats is the total number of seats in the aircraft leased by the airline.
Widebody is the fraction of wide-bodied aircraft leased by the airline. Proﬁtability is operating income
before depreciation divided by the book value of assets. Bankruptcy is a dummy variable taking on the
value of one in those years in which an airline is under the protection of Chapter 11, and zero otherwise.
All regressions include an intercept (not reported) as well as year ﬁxed-eﬀects. t-statistics are calculated
using standard-errors that are clustered by airline and reported in parenthesis.
Dependent Redeployability Redeployability Redeployability Redeployability
Variable= (# of aircraft) (# of operators) (# of operators (ﬂeet-share)
≥ 5a i r c r a f t )
Sales 20.80 -2.21 0.233 0.013
(0.59) (-0.51) (0.15) (1.33)
Seats × 10
−5 -854.51 -199.88 -41.90 0.400
(-0.85) (-1.27) (-0.93) (1.65)
Widebody 383.85 72.04 26.64 0.012
(0.48) (0.57) (0.66) (0.07)
Proﬁtability -43.74 -0.067 -3.67 0.002
(-0.11) (-0.00) (-0.25) (0.05)
Bankruptcy -101.70 -21.56 -3.29 0.011
(-0.51) (-0.70) (-0.33) (0.48)
Firm Fixed-Eﬀects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Adjusted R
2 0.89 0.88 0.89 0.77
Observations 213 213 213 213
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C1+ C2 = l1+ l2
C1+ ½(C2 +L) = l1+ l2
 l1+ l2
 2(l1+ l2) - L 
Figure 1: Lessee’s renegotiation choice in (C1,C 2) space.
28Table 1:
The Market for TWA’s aircraft as of 1/10/2001
This table lists the 10 largest operators for the main aircraft types operated by TWA as of 1/10/2001; MD-80, DC-9, B757, and B767.
The table reports the number of aircraft per type, and the ratio between the number of aircraft per type that an airline operates and the
total number of aircraft per type.
Top-ten Operators of MD-80s Top-ten Operators of DC-9s
Number % of Number % of
# Airline of aircraft Total aircraft # Airline of aircraft Total aircraft
1 American Airlines 276 23.45% 1 Northwest Airlines 137 19.68%
2 Delta Airlines 120 10.20% 2 ABX Air 66 9.48%
3 TWA Airlines 103 8.75% 3 US Airways 46 6.61%
4 Alitalia 89 7.56% 4 AirTran Airways 35 5.03%
5 SAS 68 5.78% 5 TWA Airlines 30 4.31%
6 Continental Airlines 66 5.61% 6 US Navy 29 4.17%
7 Aeromexico 41 3.48% 7 Iberia 25 3.59%
8 Iberia 37 3.14% 8 Midwest Airlines 24 3.45%
9 Spainair 35 2.97% 9 US Air Force 23 3.30%
10 Alaska Airlines 34 2.89% 10 SAS 23 3.30%
Top-ten market share 869 73.83% Top-ten market share 438 62.93%
Total aircraft 1,177 100.00% Total aircraft 696 100.00%
Top-ten Operators of B757s Top-ten Operators of B767s
Number % of Number % of
# Airline of aircraft Total aircraft # Airline of aircraft Total aircraft
1 Delta Airlines 118 12.50% 1 Delta Airlines 113 14.05%
2 American Airlines 102 10.81% 2 American Airlines 70 9.83%
3 United Airlines 98 10.38% 3 United Airlines 54 6.72%
4 UPS Airlines 75 7.94% 4 ANA 53 6.59%
5 British Airways 52 5.51% 5 Qantas 36 4.48%
6 Northwest Airlines 48 5.08% 6 Air Canada 32 3.98%
7 Continental Airlines 41 3.34% 7 UPS Airlines 30 3.73%
8 US Airways 34 3.60% 8 Japan Airlines 22 2.74%
9 TWA Airlines 27 2.86% 9 British Airways 21 2.61%
10 Iberia 23 2.44% 10 Canadian Airlines Int. 20 2.49%
Top-ten market share 618 65.47% Top-ten market share 460 52.71%
Total aircraft 944 100.00% Total aircraft 804 100.00%
29Table 2:
Estimates of the Savings from Lease Negotiations in American Airlines’ Acquisition of TWA
This table summarizes the savings from lease renegotiation in the acquisition of TWA by American Airlines. Panel A presents TWA’s
Actual and Expected Lease Payments for 2001 and onward as of 12/31/2000. Panel B displays American Airlines’ Expected Lease
Payments for 2001 and onward as of 12/31/2000. Panel C presents American Airlines’ Actual and Expected Lease Payments for 2001
and onward as of 12/31/2000, and provides an estimate of the risk-adjusted savings from lease renegotiation on American Airlines’s
acquisition of TWA. Present value of capital leases are taken from airlines’ ﬁnancial reports.
Panel A: TWA’s Actual and Expected Lease Payments for 2001 and onward discounted of 12/31/2000
2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 and after
Operating Leases $553 $538 $528 $518 $3,263
Present value of operating leases (@ various rates b/w 9.7% and 14.7%)= $3,293
Present value of capital leases = (@ various rates b/w 9.7% and 14.7%) = $139.5
Present value of total future lease payments (operating+capital) = $3,433
Fleet-share taken by American (value-weighted)=0.78
Leases value taken by American =0.78*$3,433=$2,677.6
Panel B: American Airlines’ Expected Lease Payments for 2001 and onward as of 12/31/2000
2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 and after
Operating Leases $950 $898 $910 $893 $880 $11,268
Present value of operating leases (@ 6.6%)= $11,442
Present value of capital leases (@ 6.6%)= $1,364
Present value of total future lease payments (operating+capital) = $12,806
Panel C: American Airlines’ Actual and Expected Lease Payments for 2001 and onward as of 12/31/2000
2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 and after
Operating Leases $1,188 $1,314 $1,256 $1,180 $1,119 $1,054 $11,622
Present value of operating leases (@ 7.7%)= $12,481
Present value of capital leases = (@ 7.7%)= $1,647
Present value of total future lease payments (operating+capital)= $14,128
During the year 2001 American Airlines dismissed 3% of its leased aircraft (value-weighted)
Diﬀerence between Expected Lease Payments=$14,127.8-0.97*$12,806.5=$1,705.5
Amount American saved on TWA leases (adjusted for risk)=$2,677.6-$1,705.5=$972.1
30Table 3:
Airline Characteristics
This table provides descriptive statistics of airline characteristics. Lease expenses are total aircraft lease expenses (in $
million), Lease Expenses/Assets are total aircraft lease expenses divided by the book value of the assets, Actual/Expected−1
Lease Payments is the ratio of an airline’s actual lease expenses to its previous year’s minimum expected lease payments,
ln(Lease Expenses/Lease Expenses−1) is the yearly change in lease payments, Leased-ﬂeet (aircraft) is the number of aircraft
leased by the airline, Leased-ﬂeet (seats) is the total number of seats in the leased-ﬂeet. Wide-body is the fraction of wide-
bodied aircraft leased by the airline, Proﬁtability is operating income before depreciation divided by the book value of assets,
Cash Flow is income before extraordinary items + depreciation and amortization divided by assets, Low Cash is a dummy
variable that equals one for airlines in which cash ﬂow from operations (income before extraordinary items + depreciation
and amortization) plus cash balances are less than their interest expense, and zero otherwise.
25th 75th Standard
Mean Percentile Median Percentile Deviation Min Max
Lease Expenses ($m) 250.4 40.3 136.3 437.7 263.2 0.312 1009.0
Lease Expenses/Assets 0.149 0.040 0.088 0.156 0.185 0.008 1.260
Actual/Expected−1 1.051 0.851 1.057 1.194 0.293 0.458 2.809
Lease Payments
ln(Lease Expenses/ 0.091 -0.022 0.058 0.184 0.254 -0.907 1.309
Lease Expenses−1)
Leased-ﬂeet (aircraft) 139 31 95 253 128 2 483
Leased-ﬂeet (seats) 20,472.1 2,851.2 7,676.6 37,712.7 22,654.5 60 80,042.9
Wide-body 0.070 0.00 0.000 0.078 0.166 0.000 1.000
Proﬁtability 9.13% 3.17% 10.41% 16.97% 17.55% -100.10% 52.42%




Panel A provides descriptive statistics for the four redeployability measures used in the empirical analysis. Panel B displays
correlations across the four redeployability measures (p-values in parentheses). Redeployability (# of aircraft) is the number
of aircraft per type, Redeployability (# of operators) is the number of operators per type, Redeployability (# of operators
with more than 5 aircraft) is the number of operators who operate at least 5 aircraft per type, Redeployability (ﬂeet-share)
is the ratio between the number of leased aircraft per type that an airline has and the total number of aircraft per type.
Panel A: Summary Statistics
25th 75th Standard
Mean Percentile Median Percentile Deviation Min Max
Redeployability 1,217.2 642.8 972.9 1672.3 861.0 49.0 3,772.0
(# of aircraft)
Redeployability 152.7 67.3 123.7 216.5 110.3 11.0 542.0
(# of operators)
Redeployability 49.9 21.0 41.8 69.8 35.5 3.1 170.0
(# of operators with
more than 5 aircraft)
Redeployability 7.57% 2.33% 4.40% 7.39% 9.71% 0.20% 58.33%
(ﬂeet-share)
Panel B: Correlation Matrix
Redeployability Redeployability Redeployability Redeployability
(# of aircraft) (# of operators) (# of operators with ﬂeet-share
more than 5 aircraft)
Redeployability 1.00 0.970 0.985 -0.473
(# of aircraft) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Redeployability 1.00 0.980 -0.444
(# of operators) (0.00) (0.00)
Redeployability 1.00 -0.450
(# of operators with (0.00)




Redeployability of Leased Fleets - selected airlines in 2005
This table provides values of redeployabilitymeasure for selected airlines in 2005 as well as a descriptionof their leased aircraft
ﬂeet. Redeployability (# of aircraft) is the number of aircraft per type, Redeployability (# of operators) is the number of
operators per type, Redeployability (# of operators with more than 5 aircraft) is the number of operators who operate at
least 5 aircraft per type, Redeployability (ﬂeet-share) is the ratio between the number of leased aircraft per type that an
airline has and the total number of aircraft per type.
Redeployability Redeployability Redeployability Redeployability Leased aircraft
# of aircraft # of operators # of operators ﬂeet-share ﬂeet
with > 5a i r c r a f t
AirTran 848.1 118.9 39.3 44.0% 77 B717-200 15 B737-700
Alaska 3,071.6 429.6 133.5 1.03% 11 MD-80 31 B737-400
5 737-700 1 B737-800
American 694.6 111.0 31.1 14.3% 24 A-300-600R 203 MD-80
10 B737-800NG 56 B-757-200
14 B767-200ER 13 B767-300ER
4 Fokker-100
Delta 1,072 151.0 45.2 5.67% 85 CRJ Regional 57 MD-88
24 B737-200 7 B737-300
44 757-200 20 767-300
9 B767-300ER
JetBlue 1,103.4 150.8 59.8 6.75% 25 A320-230 6 EMB-190
United 1,230.5 180.7 59.1 4.00% 55 A320-230 22 A319
53 B737-300 3 B737-500
10 B747-400 53 B757-200
18 B767-300 16 B777-200ER
U.S. Airways 1,547.5 233.4 74.6 6.41% 5 A330-300 13 A321
68 A320-230 88 A319
18 EMB170 23 CRJ200
7 CRJ Regional 75 B737-300
40 B737-400 44 757-200




























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Lease Expenses, Financial Distress and Redeployability
The dependentvariable in the regressionsis either the ratio of lease payments to the book value of assets (columns 1-4), or the yearly change
in lease payments - Change (columns 5-8). Sales is the logarithm of annual airline sales. Seats is the total number of seats in the leased-ﬂeet.
Seats squared is the square of the total number of seats in the leased-ﬂeet. Seats change is the annual change in Seats. Wide body share is
the fraction of wide-bodied aircraft leased by an airline. Low Cash is a dummy variable that equals one for airlines in which cash ﬂow from
operations (income before extraordinary items + depreciation and amortization) plus cash balances are less than their interest expense,
and zero otherwise. Redeployability (aircraft) is the number of aircraft per type, Redeployability (operators) is the number of operators
per type, Redeployability (≥ 5 aircraft) is the number of operators who operate at least 5 aircraft per type, Redeployability (ﬂeet-share)
is the ratio between the number of leased aircraft per type that an airline has and the total number of aircraft per type. Regressions also
include interactions between each of the Redeployability measures and Low Cash. All regressions include an intercept (not reported) and
year ﬁxed-eﬀects. t-statistics are calculated using standard-errors that are clustered by airline and reported in parenthesis.
Dependent Variable= Leases/ Leases/ Leases/ Leases/ Change Change Change Change
Assets Assets Assets Assets
Sales 0.011 0.011 0.012 0.008 0.040 0.040 0.040 0.034
(1.10) (1.11) (1.12) (0.80) (2.13) (2.04) (2.07) (1.61)
Seats × 10
−5 1.293 1.242 1.270 0.790 -0.770 -0.721 -0.736 -0.914
(2.07) (1.84) (1.95) (1.18) (-2.55) (-2.39) (-2.46) (-2.86)
Seats × 10
−5 squared -0.942 -0.895 -0.911 -0.567 0.572 0.503 0.525 0.810
(-1.84) (-1.63) (-1.72) (-1.05) (1.77) (1.57) (1.65) (2.30)
Seats change 0.037 0.038 0.040 0.046 0.385 0.383 0.389 0.378
(0.87) (0.87) (0.83) (1.07) (3.15) (3.14) (3.16) (3.31)
Wide body share -0.121 -0.106 -0.098 -0.047 0.013 0.004 0.017 0.048
(-1.25) (-0.91) (-0.84) (-0.54) (0.22) (0.06) (0.27) (1.05)
Low Cash -0.020 -0.030 -0.012 0.085 -0.208 -0.214 -0.204 -0.184
(-1.00) (-1.34) (-0.55) (1.83) (-3.00) (-2.08) (-2.55) (-1.79)
Redeployability 6.57e-06 -0.00004
(aircraft) (0.22) (-1.55)




× Low Cash 0.0004 0.001
(3.30) (1.68)
Redeployability -0.0001 -0.0009
( ≥ 5 aircraft) (-0.15) (-1.78)




× Low Cash -0.991 2.777
(-1.15) (1.19)
Firm Fixed-Eﬀects Yes Yes Yes Yes No No No No
Adjusted R
2 0.94 0.94 0.94 0.94 0.35 0.36 0.36 0.36
Observations 184 184 184 184 184 184 184 184
35Table 8:
Actual vs. Expected Lease Expenses, Bankruptcy and Redeployability
The dependent variable in the regressions is the ratio of an airline’s actual lease expenses to its previous year’s minimum expected lease
payments - Actual/Expected−1. Sales is the logarithm of annual airline sales. Seats is the total number of seats in the leased-ﬂeet. Seats
squared is the square of the total number of seats in the leased-ﬂeet. Seats change is the annual change in Seats. Wide body share is the
fraction of wide-bodied aircraft leased by an airline. Proﬁtability is operating income before depreciation divided by the book value of
assets. Bankruptcy is a dummy variable taking on the value of one in those years in which an airline is under the protection of Chapter 11,
and zero otherwise. Redeployability (aircraft) is the number of aircraft per type, Redeployability (operators) is the number of operators
per type, Redeployability (≥ 5 aircraft) is the number of operators who operate at least 5 aircraft per type, Redeployability (ﬂeet-share)
is the ratio between the number of leased aircraft per type that an airline has and the total number of aircraft per type. Regressions also
include interactions between Fleet and Bankruptcy, and between each of the Redeployability measures and Bankruptcy. All regressions
include an intercept (not reported) and year ﬁxed-eﬀects. t-statistics are calculated using standard-errors that are clustered by airline and
reported in parenthesis.
Dependent Variable= Actual/ Actual/ Actual/ Actual/ Actual/ Actual/ Actual/ Actual/
Expected Expected Expected Expected Expected Expected Expected Expected
Sales -0.056 -0.052 -0.053 -0.102 0.019 0.027 0.023 -0.005
(-2.09) (-1.98) (-2.01) (-3.03) (0.61) (0.87) (0.75) (-0.16)
Seats × 10
−5 -0.547 -0.640 -0.586 -0.002 0.066 -0.048 -0.118 0.678
(-0.78) (-0.93) (-0.84) (-0.00) (0.04) (-0.03) (-0.07) (0.35)
Seats × 10
−5 squared 0.539 0.641 0.570 0.092 0.465 0.594 0.627 0.106
(0.69) (0.82) (0.73) (0.12) (0.35) (0.42) (0.46) (0.07)
Seats change 0.171 0.174 0.175 0.183 0.248 0.256 0.256 0.240
(1.40) (1.39) (1.40) (1.52) (1.38) (1.47) (1.47) (1.49)
Wide body share 0.088 0.089 0.090 0.110 -0.171 -0.152 -0.122 -0.065
(0.54) (0.56) (0.56) (0.78) (-0.35) (-0.30) (-0.25) (-0.12)
Proﬁtability 0.160 0.168 0.162 0.256 0.087 0.085 0.088 0.078
(1.29) (1.33) (1.31) (2.04) (0.50) (0.48) (0.53) (0.42)
Bankruptcy -0.252 -0.194 -0.212 1.113 -0.277 -0.257 -0.271 0.643
(-0.76) (-0.51) (-0.63) (3.46) (-1.49) (-1.33) (-1.46) (3.39)
Seats × 10
−5 -0.002 -0.0024 -0.0025 -0.004 -0.001 -0.0009 -0.001 -0.002
×Bankruptcy (-2.67) (-2.23) (-2.58) (-3.76) (-1.17) (-0.98) (-1.23) (-2.82)
Redeployability -0.00002 -0.00006
(aircraft) (-1.35) (-0.49)




× Bankruptcy 0.003 0.0024
(1.75) (1.73)
Redeployability -0.0006 -0.002
( ≥ 5 aircraft) (-1.15) (-0.80)




× Bankruptcy -5.189 -3.070
(-4.75) (-2.60)
Firm Fixed-Eﬀects No No No No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Adjusted R
2 0.44 0.43 0.44 0.47 0.62 0.62 0.62 0.63
Observations 177 177 177 177 177 177 177 177
36Table 9:
Out of Bankruptcy Renegotiation and Large Concessions
The dependent variable in the regressions is either the ratio of an airline’s actual lease expenses to its previous year’s minimum expected
lease payments - Actual/Expected−1 (columns 1-4), or a dummy variable taking on a value of one when Actual/Expected−1 is greater
than one - (columns 5-8). Seats is the total number of seats in the leased-ﬂeet. Seats squared is the square of the total number of seats
in the leased-ﬂeet. Seats change is the annual change in Seats. Wide body share is the fraction of wide-bodied aircraft leased by the
airline. Low Cash is a dummy variable that equals one for airlines in which cash ﬂow from operations (income before extraordinary items +
depreciation and amortization) plus cash balances are less than their interest expense, and zero otherwise. Redeployability (aircraft) is the
number of aircraft per type, Redeployability (operators) is the number of operators per type, Redeployability (≥ 5 aircraft) is the number
of operators who operate at least 5 aircraft per type, Redeployability (ﬂeet-share) is the ratio between the number of leased aircraft per
type that an airline has and the total number of aircraft per type. Regressions also include interactions between each of the Redeployability
measures and Low Cash. All regressions include an intercept (not reported) and year ﬁxed-eﬀects. t-statistics (z-statistics for the probit
regressions) are calculated using standard-errors that are clustered by airline and reported in parenthesis. The Table also reports R2,( ( b )
Pseudo R2), and the number of observations. (a) dy/dx is for discrete change of dummy variable from 0 to 1.
Dependent Variable= Actual/ Actual/ Actual/ Actual/ [Actual/ [Actual/ [Actual/ [Actual
Expected Expected Expected Expected Expected] Expected] Expected] Expected]
≥ 1 ≥ 1 ≥ 1 ≥ 1
Sales -0.074 -0.093 -0.068 -0.093 -0.034 -0.025 -0.028 -0.080
(-0.49) (-0.62) (-0.48) (-0.69) (-0.81) (-0.58) (-0.65) (-1.72)
Seats × 10
−5 1.121 1.090 0.875 2.041 -3.694 -3.676 -3.696 -3.364
(0.56) (0.51) (0.45) (0.79) (-2.36) (-2.36) (-2.35) (-2.10)
Seats × 10
−5 squared -0.611 -0.591 -0.436 -1.289 4.120 4.041 4.073 4.070
(-0.42) (-0.38) (-0.31) (-0.67) (2.06) (2.04) (2.04) (2.03)
Seats change 0.267 0.271 0.268 0.251 0.151 0.170 0.177 0.152
(1.56) (1.66) (1.61) (1.60) (0.84) (0.96) (1.01) (0.76)
Wide body share 0.029 0.070 0.090 0.009 -0.618 -0.650 -0.597 -0.405
(0.06) (0.14) (0.18) (0.02) (-1.32) (-1.37) (-1.28) (-0.94)
Low Cash -0.488 -0.507 -0.478 -0.190 -0.695 (a) -0.654 (a) -0.632 (a) -0.030 (a)
(-3.42) (-2.14) (-2.88) (-1.18) (-3.00) (-2.77) (-2.91) (-0.17)
Redeployability -0.000017 -0.0001
(aircraft) (-0.15) (-1.99)




× Low Cash 0.002 0.0025
(2.34) (1.90)
Redeployability -0.001 -0.003
( ≥ 5 aircraft) (-0.55) (-1.97)




× Low Cash 0.404 -5.385
(0.10) (-2.45)
Firm Fixed-Eﬀects Yes Yes Yes Yes No No No No
Adjusted R
2 0.62 0.62 0.62 0.62 0.43 (b) 0.43 (b) 0.43 (b) 0.45 (b)
Estimation method OLS OLS OLS OLS probit probit probit probit
Observations 166 166 166 166 177 177 177 177
37Table 10:
Actual vs. Expected Lease Expenses and 9/11 Shock
The dependent variable in the regressions is the ratio of an airline’s actual lease expenses to its previous year’s
minimum expected lease payments - Actual/Expected−1. Sales is the logarithm of annual airline sales. Seats is the
total number of seats in the leased-ﬂeet. Seats squared is the square of the total number of seats in the leased-ﬂeet.
Seats change is the annual change in Seats. Wide body share is the fraction of wide-bodied aircraft leased by an
airline. Post 9/11 is a dummy variable taking on the value of one for each year following and including year 2000 and
zero otherwise. Low Cash is a dummy variable that equals one for airlines in which cash ﬂow from operations (income
before extraordinary items + depreciation and amortization) plus cash balances are less than their interest expense,
and zero otherwise. Redeployability (aircraft) is the number of aircraft per type, Redeployability (operators) is the
number of operators per type, Redeployability (≥ 5 aircraft) is the number of operators who operate at least 5 aircraft
per type, Redeployability (ﬂeet-share) is the ratio between the number of leased aircraft per type that an airline has
and the total number of aircraft per type. Regressions also include interactions between each of the Redeployability
measures and Low Cash. All regressions include an intercept (not reported) and year ﬁxed-eﬀects. t-statistics are
calculated using standard-errors that are clustered by airline and reported in parenthesis.
Dependent Variable= Actual/ Actual/ Actual/ Actual/
Expected Expected Expected Expected
Sales 0.043 0.043 0.044 0.046
(2.92) (2.84) (2.89) (2.27)
Seats × 10
−5 0.503 0.357 0.443 1.572
(0.36) (0.21) (0.31) (0.96)
Seats × 10
−5 squared 0.118 0.267 0.225 -0.654
(0.13) (0.24) (0.24) (-0.54)
Seats change 0.274 0.278 0.271 0.244
(1.59) (1.63) (1.59) (1.60)
Wide body share -0.259 -0.238 -0.209 -0.145
(-0.57) (-0.48) (-0.45) (-0.31)
Post 9/11 -0.130 -0.129 -0.133 -0.132
(-2.49) (-1.96) (-2.41) (-3.02)
Low Cash -0.419 -0.437 -0.434 -0.171
(-1.61) (-1.70) (-1.65) (-0.89)
Redeployability -0.000025
(aircraft) (-0.34)




× Low Cash 0.0021
(2.27)
Redeployability -0.001
( ≥ 5 aircraft) (-0.53)




× Low Cash 2.541
(0.74)
Firm Fixed-Eﬀects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Adjusted R
2 0.64 0.63 0.64 0.62
Observations 177 177 177 177
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